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Chapter XXXVII 
Comment: Developing the Environmental 
Law of Armed Conflict 
Professor Bernard H. Oxman* 
My reaction to the excellent papers presented today is quite simple: I agree with much of what was said. 
Since Ivan Shearer has helpfully summarized Glen Plant's classifications of the 
various positions on the issue, I let me say that the views I expressed to the United 
States Senate in 1991 place me mainly in the first camp.2 But I am willing to find 
practical ways to accommodate the objectives of those in the second camp. And I 
am ready to be persuaded by partisans of the third camp on specific points. 
That, I suppose, makes me a partisan of what Lucius Caflisch called the 
"Goldblat Doctrine," namely "to build upon what exists already and ... show a 
certain realism in doing so.,,3 We should bear in mind that almost 20 years ago, 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute study already warned that 
military disruption of the environment is exceedingly difficult to limit or control 
by legal instruments.4 
In this regard, I am not sure that all of the speakers on the panel would attach 
as much significance as I do to three points: 
1) Because armed conflict is always bad for the environment, any text 
attempting to deal with the full problem of environmental restraints on armed 
conflict in a simple and sweeping peremptory fashion is likely to force a choice 
between the obvious and the fanciful. 
2) We must be cautious about perverse effects. The practical impact of a 
particular protective legal rule may be to increase the likelihood of undesirable 
damage, for example by encouraging the militarization of a site that would not 
otherwise have been a profitable object of attack. 
3) We should not confuse thejus in bello with thejus ad bellum. Whatever the 
intent, I believe the fourth camp cannot easily satisfy these criteria. For example, 
let me quote from Sebia Hawkins' comments on behalf of the Greenpeace position 
before the American Society of International Law in 1991: 
Greenpeace believes that a Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
in Time of Armed Conflict would provide an ideal vehicle for persuading nations 
that modern warfare exacts too high of a price on the environment ... and that 
consequently, warfare is an untenable proposition for conflict resolution.S 
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This is clearly the stuff of public education and the jus ad bellum, but not the 
jus in bello. To prohibit environmental damage is to prohibit armed conflict, and 
thus not only to alter thejus ad bellum but to contradict the underlying thesis of 
the United Nations Charter about the means necessary to maintain and restore 
international peace and security.6 If Elisabeth Mann-Borgese is correct that "the 
worst of all polluters is war,,,7 then we should be seeking to strengthen the UN 
Charter system for deterring war, not redrafting the Kellogg-Briand Pact.8 
As to the second camp, let me distinguish between two issues. The first issue 
concerns the customary law status of various treaty rules dealing with the law of 
armed conflict. The debate engages a few controversial provisions of the 1977 
Additional Protocols, including Articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol 1.9 1 think a 
disservice is done to the credibility of international law when writers conclude 
that these provisions are declaratory of customary law without considering the 
impact, for example, of the statements of U.S. Government officials10 or the French 
reservation in connection with its signature of the 1981 Conventional Weapons 
Convention.ll But on the other hand, 1 can imagine more promising strategies for 
influencing the interpretation of Additional Protocol 1 than rejecting the Protocol 
and relying on a strict consensual view of customary law. 
The second issue concerns the effect of environmental treaties that do not deal 
with the law of armed conflict as such. Here a double leap is sometimes made. 
First, the treaty rule is stated to be declaratory of a similar or even broader rule of 
customary law. Second, the principle of environmental law so derived is stated to 
be applicable without qualification under all circumstances, including armed 
conflict-and perhaps even to be non-derogable because it is an obligation erga 
omnes that protects a basic public interest of all humanity. 
Articles 192 and 194 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea are sometimes invoked in this process.12 Article 192 declares, "States have the 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment." Article 194 requires 
States to "take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to 
other States and their environment." 
Article 192 was the very first, and remains the only, statement of a comprehensive 
and unqualified environmental duty of States in a widely ratified treaty. The Article 
192 that 1 helped to negotiate was the principled foundation for a much more detailed 
body of rules that follow it, explicating its meaning and effect. Not one of those rules 
even mentions armed conflict Quite to the contrary, Article 236 declares that the 
environmental provisions of the Convention do not apply to warships or military 
aircraft, subject to a more flexible duty to "ensure, by the adoption of appropriate 
measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities ... , that such vessels or 
aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this 
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Convention." Participants in this Symposium might regard this formulation as a 
rough peacetime analog of the necessity and proportionality principles. 
The Article 192 encountered in some of the literature on the subject of 
environmental protection during armed conflict (but not the papers presented on 
this panel) is treated as evidence of an unqualified environmental duty under 
customary law applicable to all of the environment, not just the marine 
environment. This is something that neither the Stockholm Conference in 1972 
nor the Rio Conference in 1992 achieved even in a non-binding instrument. Article 
192 is extracted from its detailed context, and set loose as an autonomous principle 
inviting a process of deductive reasoning informed by the policy preferences of 
the author. The principle, as such, is declared to restrain all armed forces in the 
event of armed conflict, without regard to the necessity or proportionality 
principles, while Article 192 itself does not have this effect even in time of peace. 
The problem here is that the argument is being pressed too far. A basic difficulty 
with such a move is aptly stated by Justice Feliciano: "invocation of the general 
principles reflected in Articles 192 and 194 of the 1982 Convention needs to be 
complemented by reference to applicable principles and norms of the law of war." 13 
I agree that general environmental law and environmental treaties are relevant 
to the law of armed conflict. They inform our understanding of the most general 
rules of the law of armed conflict, such as the Martens Clause.14 They also inform 
our understanding of many specific rules such as those designed to protect 
civilians, civilian objects, and property. But absent a clear indication of a contrary 
intent, they do not limit the rights and duties of States under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter or override the basic principles of the law of armed conflict itself, in 
particular the principles of necessity and proportionality. I think the U.N. General 
Assembly got it right when it relied on those principles to declare that "destruction 
of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, 
is clearly contrary to existing internationallaw.,,15 
There are absolute limitations on armed conflict that are not subject to the 
necessity and proportionality principles, although typically they are in fact 
influenced by those principles. Such absolute limitations are quite carefully 
negotiated and circumscribed. That is the explanation for the limited scope of both 
the ENMOD Convention16 and Article 35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 
not any general lack of sensitivity to environmental values. It simply stretches 
credulity to maintain that environmental treaties not negotiated with a view to 
regulating armed conflict also impose absolute limitations not subject to the 
necessity and proportionality principles. For similar reasons, I do not think it is 
quite as easy to transport Article 194 of the Law of the Sea Convention or other 
environmental rules in unqualified form into the rule declaring neutral territory 
inviolable as Professor Bothe,17 Justice Feliciano,18 and some others seem to 
believe. 
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My difficulties with some efforts to apply general environmental law and 
treaties directly to armed conflict are largely related to my concerns for the 
integrity and credibility of international law generally, and the law of armed 
conflict in particular. But there is also another reason for caution. General 
environmental law is still in its infancy, and needs to grow. It is hard enough to 
negotiate useful general environmental treaties without inviting the military 
organizations of the world to worry about the effect of those proposed treaties on 
the law of armed conflict. Some arguments being advanced about the effect of 
general environmental treaties on armed conflict are more likely to impede the 
development of general environmental law than to achieve any significant 
additional protection for the environment in the event of armed conflict. 
This does not mean the law of armed conflict should ignore useful ideas from 
other branches of international law. Environmental law, including the Law of the 
Sea Convention, makes clear that the environmental duties of a State include 
activities in its own territory. Dieter Fleck points out that the venerable and 
time-tested law of the sea principle of "reasonable regard" or "due regard" for the 
interests of others influenced the formulation of the rule in Section 44 of the 1994 
San Remo Manual that "[m]ethods and means of warfare should be employed with 
due regard for the natural environment.,,19 John McNeill clearly demonstrated 
the command and control implications of this principle when he stated that "the 
world community has every right to expect that concerns for the well-being of the 
environment will be taken into account by those planning and executing military 
operations.,,20 Implicit in his remarks, and in Conrad Harper's on Monday, was 
another important, often respected, but rarely articulated implication of the "due 
regard" principle: Consult your lawyer early and often. 
Just as many substantive maritime rules and treaties build upon the "due 
regard" principle in order to ,provide more specific guidance, so we can imagine a 
similar gradual development in the law of armed conflict rooted in the "due 
regard" principle. Thus, for example, the 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict prohibits both 
militarization and attack.21 Why not use a similar approach to protect uniquely 
valuable parts of the natural heritage from destructive attack? The type of treaty 
I have in mind would require the State in control to avoid militarizing or otherwise 
making designated environmentally sensitive sites inviting targets and, in this 
context, would prohibit attack completely.22 
The very process of thinking about what would be needed to implement this 
idea would have the felicitous effect of forcing the mind to focus on the practical 
issues that must inform the law of armed conflict. We would need criteria for 
choosing sites that emphasize unique environmental values and exclude 
substantial military implications. We would need strong international review 
procedures for designating sites and would need to consider according each State 
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the right to reject designation of a site in a timely fashion. If the object is to prohibit 
attack entirely on the grounds that there are no activities or facilities at the site that 
may make it a tempting target, then we need to consider some process of verification. 
I have no doubt that some military planners in the room are already worrying about 
the operational implications of this idea. That is their job. But we may be able to start 
developing a list of places whose extraordinary environmental sensitivity is such that, 
even if the place were militarized by an adversary, a decision regarding whether and 
how to attack would be difficult. In that case, demilitarization of a site may be a more 
balanced result than unilateral restraint. It helps ensure that both sides bear the burden 
of protecting the area, and that environmentally sensitive areas are not used as a 
practical sanctuary for military assets. 
I do not suggest that all of this would be easy. We could start, for example, by 
considering only those areas on land that are already designated parks or refuges where 
most ordinary peacetime activity is already prohibited or very strictly limited to 
scientific research and recreation. We might defer dealing with maritime areas because 
they pose special problems regarding international navigation and communication. 
In this regard, as in many others, I think the balance of the Antarctic Treatl3 is a 
useful source of general inspiration, although what I have in mind are of course very 
much smaller, less remote and more diverse areas. 
Finally, let me add my voice to that of Professor Meron24 and others who are 
frustrated by the state of the law with respect to non-international armed conflict. 
Again, I believe that attempts to incorporate general environmental law in 
unqualified form will not work, and that it is better to look to the law of armed 
conflict for the necessary qualifications than it is to look to the envirompental 
norms themselves, or to the law of treaties, for those qualifications. But it does 
seem to me that, at least with respect to the designation of unique environmental 
sites that may not be made inviting objects of attack, and that accordingly may not 
be attacked, there may be some possibility for avoiding the distinction based on 
the type of armed conflict because use of the area would be severely restricted in 
times of peace as well. 
In sum, I believe a consensus can be built around Paul Szasz' aptly stated view 
that nature is no longer fair game in mankind's conflicts.25 We should seek 
practical ways to give effect to that principle, including those outlined by 
Hans-Peter Gasser.26 That, in itself, would be no mean achievement. 
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